Jeff Bingaman United States Senator from New Mexico

[Watch Bingaman deliver the speech on his YouTube page]

Mr. President – Today I would like to state the reasons why I believe the Senate should ratify the New START Treaty.

Let me highlight some key points on what this Treaty accomplishes –

1. It reduces the number of deployed nuclear warheads by a relatively modest amount from 2200 under the Moscow Treaty to 1550;
2. Its counting regime is not based on attributing a number of warheads to a launch system but instead, like the 2002 Moscow Treaty, this Treaty counts deployed warheads;
3. It re-establishes a verification regime of inspectors on the ground, something which lapsed a year ago when START I lapsed; and
4. It still maintains a credible nuclear deterrent against Russia and China.

Before discussing some of these points in detail, let me put the New START Treaty in historical perspective. As you can see in this chart (chart 1), at the peak of the cold war, some 30 years ago there were about 60,000 nuclear warheads.  That is clearly an astounding number given that just a single warhead would destroy most major cities in the world. From 1991, when the first START Treaty was signed, to 2002 when the Moscow Treaty was signed, the number of warheads declined dramatically from about 50,000 to a little over 20,000 or about 10,000 for the U.S. and Russia respectively. This includes spare and deployed warheads. The Moscow Treaty took this count down further allowing 2200 to 1700 deployed warheads. When additional spares of about 3300 are included, that number rises to 5,500 and 5000 warheads respectively. If the New START is ratified as shown on this chart, in 2010 it will take the number of deployed warheads to 1550 from the Moscow lower limit of 1700 – a modest reduction compared to START I.

Let me make a couple of observations about this trend. First, after the cold-war ended 20 years ago, it was clear we had an excessive number of nuclear weapons.  I believe it was the hope and expectation of most Americans that there would be deep reductions in nuclear weapons. That reduction has been slow in coming.

We have declassified the number of nuclear warheads we have in our active stockpile and that number is 5113. If asked directly, I would think that most Americans would be surprised to know that in 2010 we still have over 5,000 nuclear warheads of which 2200 are deployed.

Today we have a Treaty before us that achieve a modest reduction from the Moscow level of 2200 deployed warheads to 1550. Quite frankly, I am surprised we are having this drawn out debate over it. START I took only 4 days of floor debate and lowered the number of warheads between Russia and the U.S. from about 50,000 to 20,000 or a 60% reduction. The Moscow Treaty, which lowered the total number of U.S. warheads from about 11,000 to today's level of about 5,000 - took 2 days of debate and that was a 55 percent reduction. Yet with the relatively modest 30 percent reduction as proposed by the New START Treaty from 2200 under the Moscow Treaty to 1550 deployed warheads, some are proposing a floor debate that would extend into the next Congress.

Let me turn to a number of substantive issues associated with the New START Treaty that I believe weigh in favor of its ratification by the Senate.

First, we have been briefed by the military commanders about the 1550 deployed warheads called for in the Treaty. This total is comprised of 700 deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and 800 total heavy bombers and launchers. I urge my colleagues to obtain the classified briefing on the Treaty. I believe it will be clear that the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command has analyzed in detail the strategic nuclear force structures of each side under the Treaty and is confident we can maintain our deterrence against Russia and China – who hold 96 percent of the world's strategic nuclear warheads.

The resolution of approval as reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee speaks to this issue, noting in condition 3 that before any reductions in deployed warheads are made below the current Moscow Treaty of 1700, the President must notify Congress that such reductions are in the "national security interests of the United States." Second, the intelligence community has judged we are better off with this Treaty and its inspection regime than without it. Monitoring and verification under START I, which has now expired, was based on counting strategic launch systems and then attributing a number of warheads to each submarine, airplane and missile. This counting rule overestimated the number of warheads carried on U.S. strategic systems. The New START Treaty is much more specific than START I; it counts only the actual number of warheads carried by each deployed missile. In fact this is the same counting rule as in the Moscow Treaty, which was developed by the prior administration and subsequently approved by the Senate 95-0.

Moreover, under this Treaty we have the ability to inspect on the ground with short notice to determine whether uniquely coded launchers actually carry their declared numbers of warheads.  Contrary to what some have claimed, short notice inspections of uniquely indentified launchers combined with other intelligence assets give us a high probability of detecting cheating such as uploading more warheads, which would take days to months for Russia to achieve.

Condition 2 of the resolution of approval speaks to the monitoring issue by requiring the President to certify that our National Technical Means or our intelligence assets, combined with on the ground verification is "sufficient to effective monitoring of Russian compliance with the provisions of the Treaty".

Third, there is the larger policy issue of strategic stability. This Treaty provides a framework of transparency through inspection and accountability of warheads and launchers. If we are worried about unchecked growth of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, not now but 5 years from now, it makes sense to approve this Treaty.

Many have criticized this Treaty because it does not deal with Russia's numerical advantage in tactical nuclear weapons such as gravity bombs or submarine launched cruise missiles. I would point out that none of the previous nuclear arms control treaties have dealt with tactical nuclear weapons. While I agree that we should have discussions with Russia on tactical nuclear weapons, we need this Treaty to restart the process of negotiations if we are ever going to achieve the goal of reducing tactical nuclear weapons.

This Treaty lays the groundwork for a subsequent negotiation to address tactical nuclear weapons, many of which are deployed close to our NATO allies. If we cannot demonstrate that we have the ability to enter into binding obligations on strategic nuclear forces, which are the most easily verifiable, how can we advance to the next step with Russia on reducing their tactical nuclear weapons, which number in the thousands, and are the most easily concealed?

Fourth, let me turn to the issue of modernization of our own nuclear arsenal. Despite our unsustainable budget deficit, this administration is committing an additional $14 Bn for a total of $84 Bn over ten years to modernize our nuclear weapons enterprise to ensure as we draw it down under New START, we will be capable of maintaining those weapons that we rely on. As this chart shows graphically, this funding increase is necessary in part because funding actually declined in the past decade leading to many of the problems we have today with ensuring that our existing nuclear stockpile is safe, reliable and works as intended.

Fifth, concerns have been raised regarding the non-binding Russian unilateral missile defense statement, which is separate from the binding provisions of the Treaty. In this non-binding statement Russia states that it considers the Treaty effective only where there is "no qualitative or qualitative build up of the missile defense capabilities of the United States of America."

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of State Clinton stated unequivocally that the Treaty does not constrain our missile defense efforts. Secretary Clinton goes on to say that "Russia has issued a unilateral statement expressing its view. But we have not agreed to this view and we are not bound by it. In fact, we have issued our own statement making it clear that the United States intends to continue improving and deploying effective missile defense."

In that same hearing, Secretary of Defense Gates said "the Treaty will not constrain the United States from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor impose additional costs or barriers on those defenses." Secretary Gates then goes on to say that "As the administration's Ballistic Missile Defense Review and budget makes clear, the United States will continue to improve our capability to defend ourselves, our deployed forces and our allies and partners against ballistic missile threats. "

From a historical perspective I would note that similar unilateral statements on missile defense were made by Russia on START I and START II, which this Congress approved.

Consistent with the statements by Secretaries Clinton and Gates, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's resolution of approval contains an understanding included in the instrument of ratification that "it is the understanding that the New START Treaty does not impose any limitations on the deployment of missile defenses other than the requirement of paragraph 3, Article V." This section of the Treaty prohibits the use of existing ICBM and SLBM launchers for missile defense or the conversion of missile defense launchers for ICBMs, except for those converted before the Treaty was signed.

On the question of whether we should vote on ratification in this Congress or leave this to the next Congress to consider, some Senators claim that we simply need more time and that other treaties have laid before the Congress for much longer periods. This is simply not the case. Arms control treaties since the ABM Treaty in 1972 were either taken up, debated and ratified within the same Congress or, in the cases of START II, the Moscow Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Treaty were taken up, debated and approved within the Congress from which the Foreign Relations Committee reported a resolution of approval. This historical precedent on the ratification of arms control treaties runs counter to what some of my colleagues are advocating. It is this congressional session of the Senate that received the Treaty, held 18 hearings, numerous briefings and submitted over 900 questions as part of the advise and consent process and it should be this congressional session of the Senate that should finish the job.

Mr. President, let me conclude with where I started on the New START Treaty, it is a relatively modest Treaty in terms of reducing the number of nuclear warheads. Our military commanders have analyzed the force structure under the Treaty and have concluded it maintains our nuclear deterrent and that it provides on the ground intelligence through verification that the intelligence community believes we are better off with than without.  Finally, Mr. President, it is clear that it does not impede our missile defense programs.

In my opinion Mr. President there is no credible argument that the ratification of this Treaty undermines our national security. I urge my colleagues to vote for the ratification of the New START Treaty.  I thank the Chair and yield back any remaining time.